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Searching  for  funding,  SMEs’  managers  face  various  obstacles  arising  from  information 
asymmetry,  lack  of  experience,  severe  market  conditions,  and  insufficient  or  unsatisfactory 
collaterals for banks (OECD 2006; Badulescu and Badulescu 2010; OECD 2000 and 2004; Lin 
and  Sun  2006;  Toivanen  and  Cresy,  2000).  The  collateral  issue  is  extensively  discussed  in 
literature – preventing moral hazard, the alignment the interests (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981:393-
410; Chan and Thakor 1987:345-363; Jiménez and Saurina 2004), a means to discipline the 
borrowers  behaviour  (ex  post)  given  the  existence  of  a  credible  threat  (Aghion  and  Bolton 
1992:473-494),  or  even  banking  behaviour  on  the  market  (Manove  et  al.  2001:726-744, 
Argentiero 2009). In the same time we find that the perception of firms, revealed by National 
Bank of Romania (NBR 2010) survey data, show that banks still use the collateral as a measure 
of pressure, in special in crisis times. For an important part of managers, the bank increased the 
level of required collateral for existing, renewing or new credits, asking for new covenants, 
revealing  a  paradox  of  crisis  time:  while  the  bank  loans  remained  the  favourite  method  of 
external financing needs of business, the banks often reduce their availability. Although the bank 
loan remains the favorite mean to support the growth ambitions, the higher level of collateral or 
lending costs are seen as principal obstacles by the majority of manager in EU. According to 
NBR survey, the influence of risk factors related to collateral had a climax at the end of 2008 and 
2009, when the banks have tightened the requirement for loan guarantee. Using National Bank of 
Romania (NBR 2010) survey data, we show that the banks still use the collateral as a measure of 
pressure, in special in crisis times. For an important part of managers, the bank increased the 
level of required collateral for existing, renewing or new credits, asking for new covenants, 
revealing a paradox of crisis time: while the bank loans remained the favorite method of external 
financing needs of business, the banks often reduce their availability. According to NBR survey, 
the influence of risk factors related to collateral had a boom at the end of 2008 and 2009, when 
the banks have tightened the requirement for loan guarantee. Following the European trend in 
straightening the credit conditions, Romanian market had a more pregnant evolution with a 
rapid  deterioration  of  these  conditions  during  the  second  and  the  third  quarter  of  2008.  In 
general  terms,  the  seeking  for  higher  percentage  of  coverage  with  real  estate  collaterals, 
paradoxically, makes banks more vulnerable, given their pro-cyclical behaviour, feeding the real 
estate market crisis. 
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Introduction 
This  paper  aims  to  emphasize  the  importance  of  collateral  in  credit  risk  management,  how 
collateral influences market behaviour of banks and customers selection, but also the excessive 
focus  on  collateral  coverage  during  crises  times.  In  the  first  part,  we  will  review  the  main 
theoretical approaches regarding the collateral and its importance for the credit risk management. 
In the second part we will emphasize the importance that SMEs give to the relationship with 
financing institutions, and the expectations and obstacles in credit use as important mean for 257 
growth.  We  will detail  Romanian  experience starting  from  NBR  surveys,  and  we  show  that 
banks’ response to crisis in 2009-2010 was to restrain lending, to tighten credit requirements 
(collateral,  costs  and  covenants)  and  to  enhance  caution  to  real  estate  market.  Finally,  we 
conclude on the banks’ behaviour and responses and on the consequences of this attitude on the 
economy.    
 
1.Overview on the banks’ policy regarding collaterals required from SMEs 
Focusing on value creation and based on accepted and controlled risks (OECD 2006; Pathrose 
2005, banks are often reluctant to grant loans to SMEs. This fact is due to some reasons, such as: 
-informational asymmetry, resulting from the lack of standardized financial information 
and  statements  provided  by  SMEs,  adding  the  bank's  limited  knowledge  about  the 
company seeking a loan (Badulescu and Badulescu 2010); 
-higher risks associated with SMEs lending, due to limited assets that can be used as 
collateral, low capitalization and vulnerability to market risks; 
-besides the fact that small enterprise cannot provide adequate collaterals, they hardly 
convince the banks about their managerial and marketing abilities or technical skills, that 
are essential to generate adequate cash flows and a proper debt service.  
On a first sight, the financing provided to SMEs – various, in small amounts and in a reduce 
typology compared to large companies – could involve lower cost of transactions; however, the 
situation  is,  in  fact,  different.  The  costs  involved  by  the  analysis  of  the  application  and 
disbursement of a loan are generally independent of the requested amount and usually comprises 
other fixed costs as legal taxes, costs to obtain risk information from specialized agency etc. 
(OECD 2006). In the case of small amounts, it is very difficult to recover a total cost, and the 
unique solution could be a strict control of them by standardizing the credit types, reducing the 
processing time etc. Implementing a scoring system can be a way to consistently reduce and 
uniform the transaction cost, but this step involves an important database for calibrating, major 
changes in borrower and lender mentality, and it shows real efficiency only for credit institutions 
with lots of loan application from SMEs.  
Collateral impact on credit risk, and, in a macroeconomic perspective, on the supply of credit to 
the companies, in special for SMEs, is a topic attracting a constant and increasing concern in 
recent years. From the theoretical point of view, we find two alternative interpretations that lead, 
empirically, to different predictions. On the one hand, is the adverse selection problem faced by a 
bank in financing activity, and therefore, the security offered by debtors can help alleviate this 
problem  (Stiglitz  and  Weiss  1981:393-410;  Chan  and  Thakor  1987:345-363).  Thus,  low-risk 
borrowers are willing to offer a better guarantee, considering their lower risk as a signal for their 
capabilities  fulfil its obligations under the credit agreement and, therefore, are less probability to 
lose the guarantee. The guarantee is interpreted as a signal that allows the bank to reduce or 
eliminate the adverse selection problem caused by the existence of informational asymmetries 
between the bank and borrower, when the loan was approved, (Jiménez and Saurina 2004). 
On the other hand, is the opinion, that even there is a ex ante symmetry between debtor and 
creditor (for example, the bank knows the quality of the debtor and correctly predicts the role of 
loan), guarantees are designed to mitigate the moral hazard problem once the loan was granted. 
In this respect, the security engaged helps to align the interests of both, creditors and debtors, 
thereby avoiding a situation where the borrower makes less effort to ensure the success of the 
project for which funding was granted. Security becomes a means to discipline the borrowers’ 
behaviour (ex post) given the existence of a credible threat (Aghion and Bolton 1992:473-494). 
Starting from this view, we can expect to find a direct relationship between loan quality and/or 
the borrower, and the size of collateral, i.e. the assumption that the guarantee is a signal of high 
quality borrowers. However, this hypothesis is not agreed by the bankers, who tend to establish a 
direct relation between the level of credit risk and the volume of collateral.  
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2.Banks versus customers on SMEs financing. Evidence from Romania 
For Romania, the analysis can be completed with another perspective, on the other part involved 
-  the  central  and  commercial  banks,  and  we  notice  a  pattern  similar  to  the  EU’s  one,  but 
sometimes adapted to the specific conditions of the Romanian economy and its response to the 
crisis. According to the NBR quarterly survey on lending for non financial sector and population 
(NBR, 2010), lending standards have remained mainly unchanged over the first part of 2010. The 
degree of accumulated restrictiveness seems to be deemed sufficient in the current economic 
context, based on the fact that 2009 was characterized by a relatively continuous process of 
tightening of these standards (see note, NBR, February and August 2010). 
According to these researches, the companies associated risks increased throughout the economy, 
particularly in the construction and real estate sectors and, as confirmed by above data at EU 
level, corporations have shown, for the first time in Romania last decade, a significant growth 
risks.  
At the aggregate level, lending standards (internal lending norms guiding the credit policy of the 
credit institutions) were slightly tightened in the fourth quarter of 2009, but remained relatively 
unchanged in the first half of 2010. The recent developments and projections for the next period, 
shows that the degree of restrictiveness of credit standards seem to be sufficient in terms of risk 
aversion of banks in the current economic conditions. It notes, however, that neither the euro area 
cycle tightening of credit standards is not completed, the level of restrictiveness increased in the 
first quarter of 2010 (NBR, February and August 2010) 
 
 
Sources: National Bank of Romania, Bank lending survey, February and August 2010, 
http://bnr.ro/Studies-3215.aspx şi European Central Bank, The Euro Area Bank Lending Survey - April 
2010, http://www.ecb.int/stats/pdf/blssurvey_201004.pdf?0bd480f0b472e26541e56c7c1a5f4dff 
 
In structure, slight tightening of lending standards of banks in Romania doesn’t concern the 
company  size  (SMEs.  Vs.  Corporations),  but  rather  the  criterion  of  maturity.  However,  the 
perception of risk to SMEs remains higher than corporate, explaining the reduce availability of 
bank loans for SMEs. Among the main factors which led banks to change lending standards (as 
the economic prospective, the risk associated with the industries) were the increasing share of 

























Chart  1. Changes in the lending standards, Romania 












Large companies  SMEs 
Short  term 
loans (%) 
Long  term 
loans (%) 





Q4 2007  20  50  60  40  40 
Q3 2008  40  90  90  50  70 
Q2 2009  80  60  50  60  60 
Q1 2010  20  30  30  10  10 
Source: National Bank of Romania, Bank lending survey, February and August 2010, http://bnr.ro/Studies-
3215.aspx 
 
Regarding the changes in lending terms and conditions (the specific obligations agreed between 
creditor and debtor in the credit agreement signed, i.e. interest rate, collateral, maturity, etc..), we 
notice a clear tightening in the second quarter of 2010, at the same pace as in previous quarters. 
Terms under review were mostly those related to collateral, given that over 75% of non-financial 
credit is collateralized. Frequently, banks alternate between increasing the costs or decreasimg 
the maximum available loan. 
According to reporting banks, the LTV (loan to value ratio, i.e. maximum share of credit in the 
amount of real estate collateral) for loans on the balance at the middle of 2010, secured solely by 
mortgages, stands at 87%. In the case of new loans granted in first part of 2010, banks had a more 
cautious attitude, the same indicator was 76 percent (NBR , February and August 2010).  
 
 
Source: National Bank of Romania, Bank lending survey, February and August 2010 
 
Conclusions 
As conclusion, we can notice that banks still try to avoid moral hazard in the relationship with 
borrowers –  i.e.  SMEs,  as  that  moral  hazard  can  increase in  crisis  period.  Banks  have  only 
secondary interest in the informational asymmetry issue. We also have found that the tightening 
of non-price conditions (i.e. collateral) has been used as a  recovery practice in order to cover the 
macroeconomic  or  specific  sectors  risks  increasing  the  size  of  collateral,  often  unrelated  to 
individual  performance  of  the  companies.  Moreover,  increased  propensity  for  real  estate 
collateral,  accompanied  now  by  more  pessimistic  assessment  of  market  value  (see  LTV 
development,  specified  above)  seems  to  indicate  an  emphasis  on  limited  perspective,  only 










Q4 2007 Q3 2008 Q2 2009 Q1 2010
Chart 2.  Changes in conditions of the loan contract
Collateral requirements Maximum maturity Maximum loan size 
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collateral. It seems that the link between the bank propensity for fixed collateral and cyclicity of 
real estate market (see Kim, Y.-J., Lee, J.-W
 1999, FDIC, 1998) is not yet seen by the banks as a 
valid threat. The supervisory authorities' efforts to mitigate this pro-cyclical behaviour haven’t 
got the desired effect.  
Note: 1. Interpretation and presentation of answers was based on the net percentage, given the 
difference between the share of banks that reported tightening standards, terms and conditions of 
lending, and the percentage of banks reported easing of these, a positive short term balance 
indicates that a larger  roportion of banks have tightened lending standards (NBR , February and 
August 2010). 
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